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Abstract 
Evaluating strategic investments in information technology can be difficult. 
Uncertainties exist in customer responses, competitor reactions, and thus in the 
actual economic benefits to be realized. Valuing interorganizational information 
systems (IOS) is far more complex, since the valuation is complicated by issues 
of bargaining power, and distribution of IOS benefits. Although an IOS may 
create a net benefit or economic surplu.~, valuation by the innovator contemplating 
the investment must also consider who retains these benefits. The distribution is 
in part determined by the technology's capabilities, but principally by the power 
and resource endowments of the different IOS participants. Screen-based 
securities markets represent IOSs that serve many stakeholders including 
investors, securities firms, and listed companies, as well as the securities 
exchange or vendor providing the system. The London Stock Exchange's (LSE) 
£25 million investment in trading technology at the time of its 1986 Big Bang 
deregulation did not benefit all IOS participants equally. Although the screen- 
based market produced significant benefits for the Exchange, and for investors, 
whose transactions costs were reduced, any gains retained by the LSE's member 
firms, who ultimately paid for the investment, are difficult to demonstrate. The 
damage done to those parties that paid for technological improvements at the LSE 
has led to dysfunctional behavior by the member firms, and to some deterioration 
in the quality of the market. The evidence indicates that an uneven distribution 
of benefits can potentially subvert the efficient functioning of an important 10s. 
1. Introduction 
Evaluating strategic investments in information technology can be difficult, due to 
uncertainty in customer response, uncertainty in competitor reactions, and the resulting 
uncertainty in economic benefits. Long lead times associated with developing and implementing 
strategic systems, and the possibility of significant shifts in the competitive environment prior 
to roll-out, compound risks. In addition, strategic systems may themselves radically alter the 
firm's operating environment, casting doubt on any ex ante estimates of costs and benefits. 
These difficulties in valuing strategic systems have been well documented [5][8][14]. Valuing 
interorganizational information systems (10s) is far more complex, since valuation is 
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compounded by issues of power and the allocation of benefits. Although a system may be 
capable of creating a net benefit or economic surplus, valuation by the innovator contemplating 
the investment must also consider who retains these benefits. The allocation of benefits is 
determined in part by the power and resource endowment of the participants [27[1[43], and in 
part by the technology investment itself [4][34]. 
On October 27, 1986, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) was deregulated and 
restructured by the Big Bang reforms. These changes were accomplished by replacing the 
manual floor-based trading system with an electronic market based on screen displays for price 
discovery and information dissemination. London's screen-based stock trading mechanism is 
an inter-organizational system that links three principal classes of organizations: (1) investors, 
who are either large fund management institutions such as pension funds, or  private clients, (2) 
Exchange member firms, who function as brokers and dealers on behalf of their investor 
customers, and (3) the Exchange itself, which facilitates trading and supplies services such as 
market data to participants. 
LONDON'S MARKET DEREGULATION - Glossary: 
Big Bang occurred on October 27, 1986, and was the result of a 1983 settlement reached with the 
British Government's Office of Fair Trade to end a lawsuit over restrictive practices and anti- 
competitive rules by the Exchange. The Big Bang changes abolished the fixed commission rate 
schedule, and permitted firms to operate in dual capacity as a broker-agent and as market makers 
trading for their own account with customers. A 30 percent limit on outside ownership of member 
firms was removed, and Exchange membership was opened up to overseas firms. Finally, SEAQ, 
a screen-based market mechanism, was introduced to support the new Exchange operations. 
SEAQ is the acronym for Stock Exchange Automated Quotations system, an electronic system 
displaying market makers' quotations in the 3,000 securities listed on the Exchange. The on- 
screen market is an IOS used by agency brokers, market makers, and investors. 
Market makers are member firms of the London Stock Exchange that operate as dealers, posting 
quotes, and buying and selling from their own account with customers. At the time of Big Bang, 
market makers replaced single capacity jobbers who previously stood on the Exchange floor, and 
bought and sold shares with floor brokers who represented investors. SEAQ market makers are 
required to post firm, two-way (bid and offer) quotes for shares in the securities for which they are 
registered. 
The difference between the highest bid quote and the lowest ask or offer quote for a security is 
called the bid-ask spread. The spread is a transactions cost paid by investors, but it provides a 
source of profits to dealers in a market. Increased competition and greater visibility of the market 
led spreads to became narrower on SEAQ than they had been in the pre-Big Bang floor market. 
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Figure 1 depicts the flow of information among the principal participants in the post-Big Bang 
market. 
Figure 1: LSE Market Operational Flow (Simplified) 
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This case study of events in the London equities markets since the Big Bang introduction 
of trading technology demonstrates the difficulty of estimating the benefits to be received by 
participants in an IOS, and the consequences of an eventual distribution of benefits that leaves 
one class of organizational participant disadvantaged and worse off. 
The Big Bang reforms produced important competitive benefits for the Exchange, and 
are generally viewed as having improved market quality and efficiency [13][36]. First, SEAQ 
allowed the Exchange to offer a more visible and open market to investors, and to compete for 
trading volume far more effectively with other exchanges and bourses. The Exchange itself also 
benefitted, relative to its international competitors - Continental European bourses, and to a 
lesser extent the New York Stock Exchange, and market data vendors such as Reuters - and 
through greater trading volumes and Exchange revenues. The number of the TOPIC subscriber 
terminals - exchange-supplied services to receive and display market data - more than doubled 
after the reforms, generating an additional E25 million in revenues annually for the Exchange. 
Investor customers benefitted from lower commissions, and other per trade fees paid to member 
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s were reduced. In addition, investors were able to participate in a more visible, open, and 
petitive market. 
The changes, however, were less successful from the perspective of Exchange member 
. The benefits of moving to a screen-based market do not appear to have been shared by 
ber firms. In fact, the market improvements destroyed many of the advantages historically 
fed by securities firms in London [15]. Although trading volume increased and market 
ty improved, the profit margins of Exchange members were greatly reduced or  eliminated. 
As an IOS, the screen-based market has been under pressure., Once the Exchange's 
bers realized that the market had been fundamentally altered in a: way that reduced their 
ability, they responded to the Big Bang improvements with attempts to recreate profit 
a n i t i e s  lost to the more efficient screen-based market. These actions appear to be 
nctional because members have sought to subvert some of the market quality improvements 
tced by the Exchange's systems. This has consisted of initiatives by individual firms, 
e of the market systems, and pressures for a series of changes in the Exchange's operating 
that represent concessions to market makers and some diminution in the visibility of the 
:t. 
The next section examines the improvements that resulted from the move to an openly 
:titive, screen-based market in London, and provides evidence of the benefits to some 
s of participants in this 10s. The third section details the damaging activities and private 
ives undertaken by member firms that threaten to undermine the Big Bang 
~plishments. In the fourth section, we discuss the Exchange's response to the pressures 
ave faced from the loss-making membership. The responses include revisionist tinkering 
he market rules, and a roll back of some of the transparency in the screen-based market. 
fth section is an economic analysis that uses the general principles of Nash bargaining and 
1 resources to explain the events in London. The final section is a summary and a 
sion. 
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2. The London Stock Exchange: Structure and Practices 
Immediately following Big Bang, the London Stock Exchange was regarded as the most 
progressive and efficient financial marketplace in Europe [22] [23]. Profound regulatory and 
organizational reforms took place, and innovative technological developments were highlighted 
by the introduction of SEAQ, the screen-based market system that quickly attracted equities 
trading activity, and led to the abandonment of the centuries-old market floor. The movement 
of trading activity from the market floor to firms' well-equipped upstairs dealing rooms occurred 
with unanticipated speed, and having done away with an existing trading floor, London is unique 
among major world markets [ 131 [42]. SEAQ automation supports price discovery and 
information dissemination in a quote-driven market, patterned on NASDAQ (for National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations) in the U.S. over-the-counter market. 
London has between two and twenty market makers that post bid and ask quotes in each stock; 
the average is about eight. More actively traded stocks tend to have more market makers. In 
contrast, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), assigns a single dealer, known as a specialist, 
to stand on the market floor and supervise and participate in trading in each stock. 
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MARKET STRUCTURE - Glossary: 
A range of different trading mechanisms are in use in securities markets around the world. There 
is little agreement on which market structure is best. Stock exchanges are generally either quote- 
driven or order-driven, and vary in the level of automation and market transparency they provide 
261 [421. 
In a quote-driven or dealership market, market-making intermediaries quote prices (usually on 
screens) at which they agree to buy or sell securities up to a particular size trade. Investors choose 
the best quote from among the competing market makers, and may be able to negotiate on price 
and quantity. Examples are NASDAQ in the U.S. and SEAQ in the U.K. 
In an orderdriven or auction market, investors submit buy and sell orders usually through a 
broker. An order can be a market order, an instruction to buy or sell at the best available price in 
the market at that moment. In order-driven markets, investors can also place limit orders by 
setting a limitprice as a upper bound on the most they will pay to buy, or a lower bound on what 
they will sell for. Orders are matched against one another in a central facility. Examples are the 
Toronto Stock Exchange's Computer-Assisted Trading System (CATS), and the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. The NYSE has a hybrid market structure that combines elements of order- and quote- 
driven systems. 
Liquidity is the most important determinant of the attractiveness of a market, and reflects the 
market's ability to convert between securities and cash, rapidly and with minimal impact on the 
market's price. A representative measure of liquidity is the bid-ask spread. 
Visibilily and transparency are other measures of a market's attractiveness. A transparent market 
is one in which investors know the sizes and prices of recently completed trades, and the sizes and 
quotes at which the next trades can be expected to execute. The research literature suggests that 
transparency is good for investors and enhances market competitiveness and fairness [31]. Stanley 
Ross, former managing director of Deutsche Bank, describes the opportunities for securities firms 
in the non-transparent market of the 1960s: "We had the client, who was invisible to the market, 
which in turn was invisible to him .,. we took as big a 'turn' (dealing margin between buy and sell 
prices) as we thought the market would bear." [30] 
The Exchange's membership reforms attracted new entrants and additional capital at a 
time of buoyant conditions in the securities industry. A loosely regulated international securities 
market was established to attract the wholesale trading of non-U.K. stocks to the Exchange. 
These changes gave the Exchange a competitive advantage relative to bourses in Continental 
Europe. As much as five times more trading in certain blue-chip Swedish, French, and German 
stocks occurs in London as in the home markets of those shares. 
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Big Bang Accomplishments. The Big Bang reforms have been hailed as a success.' Thirty- 
three market makers were in operation on Big Bang day, up from thirteen jobber firms (only 
three with significant market share) that handled all trading activity in the pre-Big Bang floor 
market. Overnight, the amount of capital committed to market making jumped from £60 million 
to E l  billion. Transactions costs, which consist of commissions and dealing spreads paid by 
investors, fell by a third. Table 1 details the fall in costs to institutional investors for a round- 
trip transaction, which invloves the purchase and eventual sale of a quantity of shares. 
Table 1 
Transactions Costs for Institutional Investors in London Market 
Transactions volume nearly doubled from £643 million per day in the first three quarters 
of 1986 to El. 1 billion per day in the first quarter of 1987.* One measure of the value of the 
SEAQ technology is the savings from lower trading costs. The data in Table 2 suggest that at 
pre-Big Bang commissions and spreads, investors could have paid an additional £1.4 billion 
annually in transactions costs in 1990. 
Transactions Cost Measures 1983 1986 "1988 1990 
Average commission on all trades 0.58% 0.43 % 0.28% 0.26% 
Spread (150 most actively traded 1.0% 1.0% 0.80% 0.85% 
shares) 
Average institutional commission N.A. 0.31% 0.21 % 0.16% 
Average cost of round-trip 
transaction of £100,000: £2,160 £ 1,620 £1,220 £1,170 
100,00O*(spread + 2*commission) 
* For additional detail on the market reforms, the trading technology introduced, and a survey of 
market participants' reaction to the Big Bang changes see Clemons and Weber (1990). 
1 
Data from Quality of Markets QwrferZy, London Stock Exchange, various issues, 1986-1991. 
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Table 2 
Implied Savings for Institutional Investors in London Market 
Savings to LSE Investors 1983 1986 1988 1990 
(all figures in millions) 
UK Equities: Annual £56,100 f 162,036 £ 325,500 £317,459 
trading volume 
Transactions costs to £1,212 £3,014 £ 6,054 £5,905 
investors with 1986 
commissions & spreads 
Estimated actual total spread N.A. N. A. £4,427 £4,508 
and commission costs , 
Implied Savings to Investors N.A. N.A. f 1,628 f 1,397 
relative to 1983 Costs 
The figures in Table 2 for the net savings and surplus from Big Bang naturally are only 
approximations. Savings in trading costs may be somewhat overstated, since trading volume 
would not have increased so dramatically without the reduction in commissions and spreads. 
However, benefits from increased trading resulting from the Big Bang reforms - often called 
the value of beneficial trade - have been excluded from our analyses. 
The Exchange received benefits from the IOS. The number of TOPIC terminals used 
to deliver the Exchange's market information service grew from 4,312 in June 1986 to over 
10,000 by 1990. Depending on the version used, each terminal generates £3,000 to £5,200 per 
year in revenues for the Exchange. Thus, market growth in the wake of Big Bang contributed 
an additional £25 million to the Exchange just from market data services. Reflecting the rise 
in market volumes and complexities of the new market, the Exchange's staff grew from 1,200 
in 1985 to 2,838 in 1989. 
The Exchange also succeeded in establishing an active international market for trading 
of non-U.K. securities away from their home exchanges. London is the most global stock 
exchange today, listing about 750 non-U.K. stocks, and attracting more than two-third of all 
equities trading that occurs outside of the stock's country of origin, according to the Bank of 
England [lq. There were 54 f m s  operating as market makers on SEAQ-International in 
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January 1992. Trading volume on SEAQ-International grew from nothing in 1984 to £400 
million a day in 1987, and in 199 1 exceeded £1. 1 billion a day, or about the same volume as 
recorded in the U.K. domestic equities market. Although daily trading volume of domestic 
stocks in New York and Tokyo is far greater than in London, trading volume of overseas 
securities on the New York Stock Exchange averaged just $441 million (£250 million) a day in 
1991, and on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, it was just $77 million per day in 1991. 
Table 3 
Extent of Cross-Border Trading in Major Stock Markets 
The success of SEAQ-I has come mostly at the expense of less liquid and more costly bourses 
in Continental Europe. The loss of trading volume in blue-chip Swedish, French, and German 
shares prompted market authorities in those countries, and led them to modernize their markets 
and implement reforms aimed at lowering trading costs and repatriating trading volume. Table 
4 indicates the volume of SEAQ-I trading in London relative to the home markets. 
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Non-Domestic Average daily As a percentage 
Listings trading volume in of total market 
199 1 non-domestic shares trading volume 
1991 ($ million) 
725 1,992 46.2% 
108 441 6.6 % 
27 8 114 3.7% 
125 77 2.2% 
570 48 2.9 % 
236 18 3.7% 
London 
New York 
NASDAQ 
Tokyo 
Germany 
Paris 
L 
Domestic Average daily 
Listings trading volume in 
1991 domestic shares 
1991 ($ million) 
2,243 2,318 
1,678 6,278 
3,917 2,938 
1,614 3,384 
649 1,620 
449 468 
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Table 4 
SEAQ-International Trading Volume in Continental European Stocks 
Post-Big Bang Market Practices. The London Stock Exchange operates as a competing dealer 
market. In each stock there are a number of dealers, or market makers,, that provide bid quotes 
1 
(the price at which they will buy shares from customers), and ask quotes (the price at which they 
will sell shares to customers). The SEAQ system has one "page" for each issue that displays 
all market makers registered in that security with their bid and ask quotes. There is also an 
indication of the number of shares the market maker is willing to commit to at those prices. By 
negotiating over the phone, a trader can usually buy and sell in larger quantities than those 
shown, and market makers will often agree to trade at prices different than those on the screen. 
Similar to the NASDAQ market in the U.S., dealers are geographically dispersed. Several 
SEAQ market makers are in fact located in Edinburgh, Scotland, and several SEAQ-I market 
makers operate out of dealing rooms in Paris and Frankfurt. SEAQ information is displayed on 
computer screens, and investors, or brokers acting on behalf of investors, contact and make 
trades with dealers over the telephone. The inside quotes displayed on the SEAQ screen, also 
called the touch, represent the best bid and offer available in London, and are prominently 
displayed, double sized, in a yellow strip at the top of the SEAQ screen for each stock. The 
intent when SEAQ was implemented was for the yellow strip to give a rapid and accurate 
indication of the price at which the next trade in any share could be expected to occur. Once 
a trade is executed the details of price and number of shares are transmitted to the Exchange, 
which then publishes the stock's cumulative trading volume and the prices of the most recent 
transactions on the screen above the yellow strip. 
Netherlands 
France 
Switzerland 
Germany 
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SEAQ-I Trading Volume: Daily As a percentage of the home 
Average in 199 1 (millions) market's trading volume 
$165.60 50.3 % 
$244.80 26.7% 
$125.20 25.8% 
$500.00 12.2 % 
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Table 5 
Sample SEAQ Screen for Imperical Chemicals Industries 
Best bid Best offer 
Stock SEAQ FT-SE 100 QUOTES 45347 11 :36 -Time 
symbol 
Day's cumulative ICI 1300-1305 
share voh.~me LT 1303 5 6 3 1 4 11 :33 + Time of 
Last trade last trade 
prices RAML BZWE SBRO 1303-8-WARB P&DT MGSH 
AlTK 1300-010 5x5 MOST 1303-013 5x5 
BZWE 1303-009 50x50 NMRA 1300-010 50x50 / CNWM 1300-010 50x50 P&DT 1303-008 5x5 
FLMG 1302-009 50x50 RAML 1303-01 3 10x10 
Competing market 
makers GSCO 999-009 25x25 SALB 1302-0 12 50x50 
HOAE 1300-010 50x50 SBRO 1303-010 ILx IL  
KGLE 1301-008 50x50 SLAM 1301-01 1 50x50 
MERL 1302-012 25x25 WARB 1301-008 1 LxI  L 
MGSH 1300-008 5x5 % Quote prices 
and sizes 
Traditions in the London market and the competitive environment since the Big Bang 
have led to trading practices that would be alien in most securities markets. London's market 
makers are generally willing to hold in their inventory large principal positions resulting from 
buying from or selling to an investor customer. Remarkably, this is generally done without 
assessing whether there is likely to be an interested counterparty to eventually take the other side 
of the trade. Moreover, shares in large companies will have a bid-ask spread of only a few 
pence. Since the average share price is about £3, this is often less than 1 percent of the share 
price, making it extremely difficult to recover losses from bad trades. As a result, market 
makers' risks are large, even in everyday trading. 
On the New York Stock Exchange, the specialist market maker may offer firm quotes 
in an lhth (12.5C) spread, which is generally less than 1 percent of the share price for NYSE- 
listed issues, which have an average share price of about $35. However, these quotes are good 
for up to only 5,000, and sometimes only 500 shares, rather than for 100,000, or even 500,000 
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shares, as commonly occurs in London. Although large trades, occasionally for a million or 
more shares, occur in New York, they generally involve a block trading desk. Block traders 
will carefully locate counterparties - customers who will take the other side of the trade - 
before orders are submitted to the floor, matched, and reported on the ticker tape. The London 
practice of a member firm taking on a large principal position is far less common on the New 
York Stock Exchange, and generally requires a far more generous spread to be paid than in 
London. 
3. Crises in London 
The Big Bang reforms created a transparent, screen-based mhrket, and opened the 
Exchange up to corporate and foreign membership. Buoyant conditions, and visions of 
developing into global financial services conglomerates, led three of the four large U.K. clearing 
banks, and a handful of U.S. and European banks, to enter the U.K. securities industry. 
Acquirers of U.K. brokers and market making firms spent £750 million in 1985 and 1986. In 
the period after Big Bang, the U.K. market continued to rise. The FTSE-100 index of the 100 
largest U.K. stocks rose nearly 50 percent between October 1986 and September 1987. Since 
member firms tend to hold maintain a net long position in the stocks that they trade, the 
market's rise contributed to profits. 
After the bull market ended in October 1987, and trading volumes declined, it became 
clear that member firm profitability would not be easily restored. Observers realized at that time 
that "banks from around the world which applied their financial muscle to the new U.K. market 
ended up committing far more capital than could ever earn an adequate return." [23] There 
followed a period of acrimony among market participants, and the accomplishments of the 
Exchange and the adoption of new trading practices no longer seemed so praiseworthy. The 
transparency of the screen market and the pressures of overcapacity led to competitive spoiling 
tactics by market makers, who attempted to force losses on competitors that completed large 
trades. There has been a deterioration in the information displayed on the SEAQ screen, and 
dealers have posted quotes on SEAQ that did not represent the prices or volume at which they 
were prepared to deal. 
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Persistent losses combined with acrimonious debates about trading practices have led to 
a belief that elements of the London system of competing market makers and screen-based price 
discovery are fundamentally flawed [23][35][36]. The Stock Exchange warned in a report that 
"this dissatisfaction will lead to an initiative to set up an alternative retail market . . . (that) would 
give rise to market fragmentation and the possible disintegration of the overall domestic market. " 
[38] Many came to feel that the level of transparency in the screen-based market prohibited 
member firms from earning an adequate return on the capital they had committed to the market. 
Losses: October 1987-January 1989. The problems associated with London's excess capacity 
and screen-based market appeared just after the price crash in October 1987. Although the 
SEAQ system operated nearly flawlessly, with only temporary interrupti~ns during the crash and 
the deluge of orders, the FTSE-100 index fell 22.4% the week of 19 October 1987. London's 
market makers were net buyers of £250 million in shares on Black Monday, and their fourth 
quarter trading losses wiped out the £400 million in member firm profits in the first three 
quarters of 1987. Following the crash, customer turnover fell more than half from its peak of 
f 1.34 billion daily in October 1987 to £664 million in February 1988. Annual turnover in 1988 
and 1989 was only slightly greater than the pre-Big Bang levels, and about 40 percent less than 
the 1987 level. On top of falling business volumes, margins were collapsing. Competition was 
driving dealing spreads and commissions lower, and market volatility continued to place trading 
positions at risk. Member firms posted an aggregate loss of over £200 million on their equities 
trading business in 1988. By late 1988, many market observers grew to believe that the SEAQ 
trading technology introduced at the time of Big Bang made the market too transparent and too 
efficient. The Economist described the conditions simply: "High tech share trading is 
theoretically perfect, and practically unbearable. " [35] 
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Table 6 
Events in London Market Since Big Bang 
CHRONOLOGY - London Stock Exchange since Big Bang: 
1986 7987 
- -  
1988 
Oct.86 Oct.87 Price crash: Aug.88 Price 
Big Bang Member firms war reduces 
lose £350 million market maker 
in 4th Quarter spreads 33% 
& cuts size 
Mar.87 Automatic Volume of quotes 
trade execution 40% below 
systems introduced 1987 levels 
Feb.89 Market Member firms Jan.91 
rule changes lose £350 revisions 
end immediate million for to rule 
trade publication the year changes 
for large trades & 
eliminate obligation 
for inter-market 
maker trading 
As losses and dissatisfaction with the Exchange increased, members began to take actions 
on their own to improve their financial performance. These actions, which we describe in the 
next section, while rational from the perspective of individual members, were damaging to the 
market, and in aggregate precipitated a serious crisis by the summer of 1988. We describe 
below actions that members took in their attempts to recover what they perceived as an 
acceptable return due to them, that is, their share of the benefits created by the technological 
improvements to the market at the time of Big Bang. 
Spoiling tactics. London's market makers provide immediacy to the market: an investor who 
wishes to trade can generally execute his transaction rapidly through a market maker rather than 
waiting for a block trading desk to assemble the other side of the trade as in an NYSE-style 
auction market. Several market makers that we spoke with in November 1988 described the 
"illusion of liquidity" in the new market; that is, all but two or three market makers were 
posting quotes for large size trades only because they knew could lay off any unwanted positions 
on other market makers. For instance, a market maker without enough investor contacts to be 
able to "work off' a large position could still post on-screen quotes for 100,000 shares or more, 
and then rely on the obligation of market makers to trade with one another at their screen prices 
to get rid of unwanted inventory. With lower trading volumes and fewer opportunities to 
unwind positions, SEAQ market makers began to fear being "hit" at their screen prices by other 
market makers. Market makers accused each other of "passing the parcel" by completing a 
trade with a true customer, such as a pension fund or an insurance company's investment unit, 
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then quickly laying off the unwanted position and the risk by trading with other market makers. 
Market makers began to respond immediately to positions taken by their competitors. If it 
appeared a rival market maker had acquired a large long position in a stock, the other market 
makers would lower their prices to the point at which the original trade was loss-making. If it 
appeared a rival market maker had sold a substantial position in a stock, the other market makers 
would raise their prices. The head trader at a leading British securities house told us, "I get hurt 
by taking a position now - the other market makers are spoiling my trades. "3 
U.K. EQUITIES MARKET - Terminology: 
\ 
Passing the parcel occurs when a market maker trades with a customer, but rather than holding 
the position or working it off through trades with other investors, he or she bontacts another 
market maker to lay off the position. 
Firms have been accused of fair weafher market making for using market maker privileges or 
operating as a market maker without accepting the implicit responsibilities to contribute to market 
liquidity in both normal and adverse market conditions. Many of the large market makers argue 
that firms with small market making operations in London avoid trading or quote unattractive 
prices at times of uncertainty and stress in the market. 
From the perspective of financial economists, a market maker quoting the best bid or ask price on 
SEAQ is sifting duck, vulnerable to other traders with better or more timely information. For 
instance, a trader that is aware of influential news about to be released can trade immediately with 
a market maker before the price adjusts to reflect the new information. 
Preferencing occurs when an investor or a broker directs or "preferences" his orders to a market 
maker that is not quoting the best price in the market at that time. The market maker contacted 
will match the best quotes to do the trade, but this can be detrimental to market quality since it 
reduces the incentives to make the best prices. 
Parasitic pricing occurs when market prices that are electronically disseminated are used by other 
traders as the basis for their own pricing. A firm that offers to trade with its customers (e.g., 
through an automated order execution system) at prices being quoted by other traders in a market 
is benefitting from the availability of market prices, but is siphoning trading volume away from the 
providers of market quotes. This is a form of free-riding in which the beneficiaries of the prices 
do not contribute to their creation. 
Personal interview, November 1988. 
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It is impossible to ascertain with certainty whether spoiling tactics represented a simple 
move by the market to a new equilibrium price, reflecting the significant imbalance between 
supply and demand created by a large trade, or a deliberate spiteful attempt to damage a rival 
market maker for successfully completing a large trade. Nevertheless the effect on market 
maker profits was the same, and the largest firms, which were most likely to be contacted by 
other market makers, began to take defensive actions. Some reduced their quote sizes to the 
minimum 5,000 shares permitted for the most active category of stocks. Other market makers 
widened the difference between their bid and ask quotes, but offered to trade 100,000 or 
200,000 shares [35]. Although there was no indication of this on the SEAQ screen, the first 
group was generally willing to trade in far larger size than displayed, but did not want to be 
obligated to trade with other market makers in more than their posted. 5,000 share size. The 
second group was generally willing to offer real customers a better price than what was 
displayed, but rival market makers would only be offered the unattractive prices posted on the 
screen. Although these actions did not restore market maker profits, the effect was to blur and 
distort the information available on the SEAQ screen, and to force other market participants to 
decipher what actual prices might be made available to them. 
In a dramatic, if somewhat self-destructive, one day protest in November 1988 aimed at 
trading practices and trading rules on the Exchange, Bernard Leaver, head of market making at 
Lehman Brothers International, posted equal bid and ask quotes (zero spread) that were firm for 
trades of up to 10,000 shares in British Aerospace. Later in the day, market pressures forced 
him to retreat. 
Deterioration of SEAQ prices and market fragmentation. Investors began to realize that 
SEAQ quotes were less than a clear signal of the true trading prices available, and they 
increasingly sought to improve upon market makers' screen quotes. Aware that the screen 
prices were not necessarily representative of market sentiment, the Exchange itself noted in its 
Fall 1988 Quality of Market Review that "institutional investors have found it necessary to 
negotiate for the best deal" [28]. We sampled LSE transactions data in nine stocks in July 1989, 
and showed that 44.5 percent of all trading volume was being done at prices better than the 
SEAQ touch quotes displayed at the time of the trade (data reported in [22]). This meant that 
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there could be multiple prices for what was ostensibly the same trade, depending on the 
negotiating ability of the trader. Brokers have a fiduciary obligation to provide 'best execution' 
for their clients, which ordinarily means demonstrating that no better quoted prices were 
available than those obtained for clients. Assessing best execution is difficult when nearly half 
of trading volume is negotiated inside the best, screen-displayed quotes. Questions arose as to 
whether small investors and overseas institutions with less influence were getting quality prices 
in the market. In the absence of a trading floor, it is not clear what the concept of a central 
market with a single best quote means. Rather than appearing to be a consolidated central 
market in which all participants are on equal footing, data from the SEAQ market has exhibited 
signs of market fragmentation, in which several prices might exist for trades completed in a 
single stock at any one time. 
+ .  
Market fragmentation is damaging because as the degree of integration drops and the 
market begins to behave as a collection of smaller, less liquid markets, most measures of market 
quality begin to drop as well. Orders execute less quickly, or do so at inferior prices. Fairness 
deteriorates as some customers perceive that they are receiving inferior prices. Confidence in 
the market may drop. Ultimately trading volume may be lost if alternative markets, such as the 
New York Stock Exchange - which lists about 55 British equities in American Depository 
Receipt (ADR) form - are perceived as offering more consistent and fair pricing. 
The SEAQ display is widely available to institutions and brokerage firms, and there are 
no off-exchange trading prohibitions such as Rule 390 in the U.S. (which dictates that NYSE 
member firms to route their orders to an exchange floor) to require orders to be brought to a 
SEAQ market maker. Thus, in London, a broker can choose not to bring customer orders to 
the market, and to serve as a market maker if conditions make this advantageous. As a result, 
market makers have accused brokers of 'ffair-weather market making", that is, functioning like 
a market maker when it suits them, and standing out of the way and relying on the obligations 
of regular market makers when difficult, high-risk situations arise. Brokers often search out 
counterparties for investors in hopes of finding a "cross" or a "put-through" at a price between 
the best bid and ask quotes displayed on SEAQ. For instance, if a stock that has a SEAQ bid 
of £3.00 and an ask quote of £3.03, a broker with a customer that wanted to sell could try to 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-92-19 
Turmoil, Transparency, and Tea: IT in London's Stock Market Page 18 
find another investor that wanted to buy at £3.01 or £3.02. The broker and the two customers 
would be better off, but the central market has been bypassed and those that risk their capital 
as dealers suffer. This may initially appear beneficial, and brokers who negotiate these internal 
crosses argue that they are indeed good for both parties to the trade. Exchanges argue that these 
crosses have two problems: 
They do not show the orders to market makers, and thus deny customers 
the possibility that the market maker may in fact offer a better price than 
the broker, 
They deny the market makers the reward for their obligation to participate 
in all trades, including risky, difficult ones where the counterparty is not 
readily identified, and reduce their incentive to make the best quote, 
causing market quality to deteriorate. 
Because trades often occur with the benefit of a screen price, but without the participation of 
market makers, the incentives for market makers to participate in price discovery on the SEAQ 
screen are potentially weakened. 
Preferencing. Since market makers are obligated to honor their SEAQ quotes to other market 
participants, posting the best bid or ask quote carries a large associated risk. The market maker 
becomes what Amihud and Mendelson refer to as a "sitting duck", vulnerable to traders who can 
exploit any information advantage that they have by trading with the market maker before the 
price adjusts to reflect the new information [I]. Fundamental to the functioning of SEAQ's 
competing market maker system is the principle that the market maker who accepts the risk of 
quoting the best buy or sell price, and doing so the earliest and in the largest size, should be 
rewarded with order flow. The intent was for traders to direct their orders to market mikers 
in the yellow strip, providing a strong competitive incentive to supply attractive quotes, while 
those members making inferior quotes would see little or none of the business. However, in an 
analysis of trading records from July 1989, we found that the market maker(s) quoting the best, 
or inside price for a stock received only 41.3 percent of the incoming trading orders, with the 
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rest going to market makers quoting less attractive prices, but who were willing to match the 
best prices posted by their  rival^.^ The explanation often given for such preferencing of order 
flow is that established relationships between brokers and market makers, or investors and 
market makers, leads many orders to be directed not to the market maker quoting the best price, 
but to firms that have good reputations for trading in large size or matching or improving upon 
the best available quote. 
At the time of Big Bang, preferencing was viewed as a potentially very serious problem, 
for the following reasons: 
• Unlike order-driven markets such as the New York Stock Exchange, 
where prices are generally determined by customers submitting limit 
orders for specific quantities of stock at specified prices, in quote-driven 
markets it is only the quality of the market makers' quotes that determines 
the quality of price discovery. 
a The higher the proportion of trades that are directed to the market maker 
providing the best quotes, the stronger the economic incentives supporting 
tight and accurate pricing. This is also essential for rewarding the market 
maker for the risk of making firm quotes for the entire market to see, and 
that can be picked off by a better informed trader. 
If preferencing becomes widespread, and if this is widely known by market makers, their 
incentive to participate actively in price discovery through competitive SEAQ quotations is 
greatly reduced, and market quality suffers greatly. Many market observers, and the Exchange, 
are concerned that the current level of preferencing will in time harm the efficient functioning 
of the market. 
Data reported in Franks and Schaefer (1990). 
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Automatic execution and parasitic pricing. The introduction of proprietary automated small 
order execution systems is another controversial step that member firms have taken to regain lost 
profitability. Unfortunately, it also threatens the efficient functioning of the SEAQ market. In 
March 1987, Kleinwort Benson rolled out the BEST system, and in mid-1988 Barclays de Zoete 
Wedd introduced its TRADE system [12]. Both of these systems allow brokers anywhere in the 
U.K. to key orders into a terminal for their clients. The order is electronically routed to the 
firm offering the system, and the trade is executed at the best available quote in the stock on the 
SEAQ screen and confirmed on-line in a matter of seconds. The shares are deducted from or 
added to the market maker's inventory in the stock, and details of the trade are passed on to the 
Exchange for reporting and settlement. 
These automatic execution systems employ "parasitic pricing ". Orders input to TRADE 
and BEST are routed to the Kleinwort Benson or BZW market makers, who execute the trades 
at the inside price in the market regardless of the price they were quoting on SEAQ at the time. 
In other words, the firms with automated execution systems make preferencing automatic. These 
systems are only possible because of the electronic dissemination of SEAQ prices, and the ability 
of any market maker to match the best quotes in the market. Some observers have argued that 
this is unfair to the provider of those quotes, who is putting capital at risk, but is not being 
compensated or enabled to participate in the trades that their quotes have helped to attract to the 
market. T;?e brokers gain because their transactions costs are reduced while clients still get best 
execution of their orders. The two market making firms with automated systems gain because 
they receive a flow of orders even if they are not making the best quotes in the market. 
Unfortunately, the Exchange market may be harmed because the market maker displaying the 
best prices does not receive subsequent orders, reducing the incentive to make the best price and 
to participate in on-screen price discovery. 
Automatic order execution systems have grown to account for about 5,000 trades out of 
the 30,000 trades that are done daily in U.K. stocks. As a result, Exchange officials and other 
observers are concerned about the quality of SEAQ price discovery if proprietary automated 
execution systems continue to grow. 
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WithdrawaIs from Market Making. Not surprisingly, the erosion of profits in the London 
market has led to a reduction in the capital committed by member firms and a retreat from some 
business activities that proved unprofitable [28][30]. Total member firm capital committed to 
equities and fixed income trading fell from a peak of £3.5 billion in 1988 to £3.1 billion in late 
1990. The number of market makers has decreased from 36 in 1987 to 24 in 1991 [28]. 
4. Redressing the Balance of Benefits in SEAQ: 
Market Makers' Efforts to Restore Their Profitability 
In addition to its rule-setting and supervisory roles, a stock exchange functions as a trade 
association for its member firms. Not surprisingly, the Exchange began in 1988 to set up 
several committees to look into concerns about the market and ways to stem the further erosion 
of member firms' profits. In addition to actions taken individually by member firms to recover 
benefits lost to SEAQ, the members acting collectively through Exchange committees sought to 
effect a return to what they believe to be fair profitability. In particular, since members rightly 
saw that much of their difficulty after Big Bang could be directly attributed to improvements in 
market transparency resulting from screen-based trading, and since they believed that they were 
receiving little benefit from these innovations, their actions were directed at reversing the 
impacts of many Big Bang reforms and systems. 
The market systems innovations at the time of Big Bang appear to have produced a 
considerable surplus or societal gain when aggregated over all affected parties. The Exchange 
and its institutional trading customers were the principal beneficiaries. We identified £1.4 billion 
in annual savings to investors, and £25 million in added market data revenue to the Exchange. 
Member firms of the Exchange - market making and brokerage firms - have seen their 
performance decline and any direct value from Exchange membership evaporate. Their efforts 
to recapture profitability have involved subverting many of the market quality enhancements that 
made the efficient screen-based SEAQ market a successful IOS in 1986. Members' willingness 
to subvert the system's intended functioning - through distortions of screen quotes, 
preferencing, etc. - indicates that valuation efforts failed to determine that the IOS impact on 
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this critical group of participants would be decidedly and significantly negative. In addition, the 
LSE has taken steps to reduce market transparency. 
The Elwes Committee. In late 1988, the Domestic Equities Markets Committee was 
established, and chaired by Nigel Elwes, finance director of Warburg Securities, one of the 
largest U.K.-based securities houses. The Committee was composed of market practitioners, 
and was charged with reviewing the choice of market structure made in preparation for Big 
Bang, and recommending refinements or fundamental changes to it. Joseph Hardiman, President 
of the NASD in the U.S., has commented that "any market must allow the participants putting 
up capital to make an adequate return" [23, p. 1041. In response to such sentiment and pressure 
from its members, the LSE made several striking rule changes in F e b ~ a r y  1989. 
February 1989 Rule Changes. The Elwes Committee proposed two substantial rule changes. 
The first rule change eliminated the obligation of market makers to honor their quotes to one 
another. Previously, quoted prices and sizes were firm for all traders. Beginning in February 
1989, market makers were allowed to decline to trade when contacted by a rival market maker. 
Since the volume of trading among market makers made up about 40 percent of total Exchange 
turno-.?er in 1988, the removal of inter-market maker trading obligations was significant. The 
consequence of the rule change was to force small market makers, with fewer contacts with 
retail and institutional investors, to hold trading positions longer, and to reduce their reliance 
on larger market makers for laying off positions. 
The second change delayed the publication of trade prices until the following day for 
trades that have a value greater than £100,000. Such trades accounted for about 78 percent of 
the trading value on the Exchange in 1988. Previously trade details were published immediately. 
After February, the screen continued to register the day's cumuIative volume for each stock, but 
the prices of large trades no longer appeared in the last trade display on the SEAQ screen. The 
effect of the change was to reduce the transparency of the market, and to add to the risk of 
trading for all but the largest market makers. Because small market makers see less order flow, 
they are far less informed about prices for institutional-sized trades. The loss of transparency 
also meant that investors contemplating a transaction face the risk that a large trade has taken 
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place without their knowledge. However, the relative position of large market makers was 
improved because they see a greater proportion of the order flow and depend less on trade 
publication for this information. 
Impact of Rule Changes and Reaction. Both changes have considerable impact, and numerous 
observers have noted that the changes may be harmful to the Exchange in the long run. Richard 
Grasso, President of the New York Stock Exchange, called the changes "a giant step 
backwards" .' The U.K. Office of Fair Trading (OFT) objected to the publication delays, but 
did not block them. David Walker, head of the Securities and Investments Board (SIB), the 
U.K. counterpart to the Securities and Exchanges Commission, expressed a hope that the 
changes would be rolled back as soon as possible. The Financial ~ i m e s  in a February 1989 
editorial criticized the changes as "excessive generosity to the old club", meaning that the 
changes favored those U.K. firms that had dominated the market prior to Big Bang. 
Reactions in the U.K. varied. The major U.IS.-based market making firms applauded 
the rule changes, and those that had lowered their SEAQ sizes to the minimum 5,000 shares 
raised them after the rule change. Overseas firms that had become member firms of the LSE 
at the time of Big Bang were the most outraged by the changes. Bernard Leaver of Lehman 
Brothers International womed that London may "reduce the size of the game we're playing and 
instead of being a high-profile international market, we'll be a domestic playgr~und."~ John 
Heimann of Merrill Lynch was more direct, saying the changes were "an attempt to re-establish 
the old oligopoly", and that the Exchange was "in danger of eliminating or downgrading the very 
principle of transparency on which the new, supposedly level playing field was created." [7J 
Customers of the Exchange, the institutional investors that pay commissions and trade with 
SEAQ market makers, had mixed opinions [30][37]. Some felt that without the burden of 
immediate exposure of large trades market makers would be willing to trade more readily and 
on better terms. Most institutions did acknowledge they would be denied information. An 
During Advisory Board Meeting, U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, 
Washington, D.C., April 1989. 
Personal interview, London, 8 March 1989. 
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executive of a major U.K. pension fund stated that "the market is an information mechanism, 
and if the information is muddled, people will be more wary of using it and the market. "7 
Effect of Rule Changes. Two years after the Elwes Committee's rule changes, adequate 
profitability failed to return, and despite cost-cutting efforts, member firms had their worst year 
on record in 1990. Changes in the Stock Exchange's rules have not returned its member firms 
to, The erosion of member firm profits led to staff layoffs, to persistent losses, and in extreme 
cases to withdrawal from Exchange membership. Member firms lost £350 million in 1990, and 
about 10,000 net job losses are estimated to have occurred since 1987. There has been a decline 
from a peak of 36 market making firms in 1987 to 22 in mid-1991. Capital employed by 
member firms fell from its 1989 peak of £3.5 billion to £3.1 billion in late 1990 [28]. The 
losses suffered by exchange members in 1988 and 1990 - £200 million and £350 million - 
would have wiped out the capital of all of the firms operating in the City several years earlier. 
Annual return on capital averaged negative 2 percent between 1987 and 1990. For comparison, 
member firms of the New York Stock Exchange were affected by the post-Crash downturn in 
trading volumes, but only showed a small collective loss in 1990 and had an average annual 
return on capital of about 6 percent in 1987-1990. One of the hoped-for effects of the rule 
changes, greater trading volumes, did not occur, and trading volumes in U.K. equities continued 
to fall between 1988 and 1990, with only a slight increase in 1991. 
January 1991 Rule Revisions. The rule changes implemented in the wake of the Elwes 
Committee recommendations were intended to be temporary, and to have a beneficial effect on 
market problems and member firms' profitability. The rules were changed again in January 
1991, moderating some of the changes made earlier. The first revision restored the obligation 
of market makers to trade at their quoted price with rival market makers. Immediate trade 
publication was not reinstated, but 90 minute delayed trade publication was introduced for trades 
with a value larger than three times normal market size (NMS). The NMS is determined for 
each stock individually, and averages about £40,000. Thus, a greater proportion of trades prices 
were published after the January 1991 rule revisions. 
' Personal interview, London, 25 May 1989. 
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Some market makers continue to argue for next day publication of trade prices, saying 
90 minutes is an inadequate amount of time to unwind their position before it becomes exposed 
to the marketplace. Advocates of delayed trade publication point out that the SEAQ market 
provides a high degree of pre-trade visibility (i.e., firm, competing quotes for large trade size), 
which substantially reduces the need for post-trade publication. Since a considerable volume 
of trading occurs at prices different than SEAQ screen quotes, pre-trade information is fallible, 
and investors appear likely to benefit from broader trade publication in London 1221. One fund 
manager finds heightened transparency and the shrinking number of players has made it difficult 
to find adequate liquidity for large trades: "by the time it's done you've stuffed your own 
position. " [19] 
In spite of the January 1991 rule changes, there is still less market transparency than at 
the time of Big Bang. A blueprint for substantial refinements to the market's structure and 
trading practices is currently under consideration [40]. 
5. Economic Analysis 
Applicable Techniques. Developments in the London equities market between 1986-1991 
indie:,. that although substantial benefits were created by Big Bang and investments in 
technology at the London Stock Exchange, little of this economic surplus was retained by the 
member firms that made the investment. Some of this can be explained through analyses that 
are unique to securities markets. The relationship between transparency and member Jim 
profrrability, for example, is best described by John Phelan, former Chairman of the New York 
Stock Exchange: "Technology and communications bring efficiency. Money is made in 
inefficiency. The dealer will always go for the dark. It's the investor that will always pull it 
back to the light." [23] Technology, by increasing the flow of information, reduces or 
eliminates inefficiencies, and thus cuts profit opportunities for member firms. Market makers 
cannot buy low and sell high, earning a large "turn", when customers are equally well informed. 
Brokers cannot charge high commissions for locating the market maker with the best quote and 
directing the order to the floor; there now is no floor, and institutional investors can scan a 
SEAQ screen and call market makers by phone as easily as can their brokers. 
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More general techniques for examining the valuation and distribution of benefits from 
investments in interorganizational systems are available, and we show how the experience of the 
London financial markets can be explained in a more general IOS context. The analytical 
techniques that we will consider here are Nash bargaining and critical resources. 
Nash bargaining can be used to assess distribution of benefits in 
interorganizational systems [9]. 
Examining the critical resource endowments of IOS participants will shed 
light on the eventual distribution of benefits in interorganizational systems 
[lo]. 7 .  
Nash bargaining is one of several recognized techniques for examining how the benefits 
of complex cooperative arrangements are divided among participants [26][29]. It starts by 
examining the total net economic surplus created by the cooperative relationship; that is, it 
examines the total benefits of players with cooperation and the total benefits of players without 
cooperation. There is, however, no guarantee that a player will actually realize the benefits 
implicit in the cooperative solution; other players may feel disadvantaged or resentful, and may 
defcct or threaten to sabotage the cooperative relationship if they are not compensated. Thus, 
it is essential to examine the bargaining power of all players in the cooperative relationship. 
Nash bargaining then examines the next best solution for each player if he leaves the cooperative 
relationship. Most importantly, for each player the Nash bargaining approach calculates the 
difference between the benefit implicit in cooperation, and the benefit if this single player were 
to defect. Each player's relative bargaining power will be determined by the difference between 
his solution under cooperation and his solution if he defects. A player whose benefits are not 
radically altered will have considerably more bargaining power than a player who would be 
seriously damaged by unilateral defection. Finally, it is necessary to divide the total sutplus 
created by cooperation among the parties cooperating on the basis of their relative bargaining 
power. This usually involves transfer payments from weaker-positioned players to ones in a 
stronger bargaining position. Nash bargaining suggests dividing the surplus so that a player who 
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will not be badly hurt if the cooperation ends will receive far more of the surplus created by 
cooperation than a player who is more dependent upon continued participation. 
Analysis based on endowment of critical resources suggests that players who possess 
critical resources not readily duplicated will receive a greater share of benefits than will players 
without such advantages [34]. Using Teece's terminology, a weak appropriability regime on an 
innovation - due to the absence of barriers to competitive duplication - implies that the 
innovator will be unable to retain benefits, while tight appropriability and the presence of 
barriers suggest retention of benefits. If the innovation requires inputs (i.e., factors of 
production) and these are obtained in a competitive factor markets, essentially as commodities, 
the suppliers will not be able to charge a premium for participation. Alternatively, if the 
innovation requires access to resources controlled by a limited number of suppliers, these 
suppliers will be able to retain a significant portion of the benefits created by innovation. 
Application to London's Big Bang. The London Stock Exchange acts as a vendor of services 
to its investor customers and to its market makers: 
It consolidates and distributes market maker quotes through SEAQ and 
TOPIC. 
It publishes information on trading activity and reports market indexes. 
It provides services after the trade is completed, especially settlement and 
clearing. 
Member firms are suppliers to the Exchange and to its customers. Brokers provide 
customer's with access to the Exchange market, while market makers provide quotes and the risk 
capital needed to offer customers immediate trade execution. The Exchange sets the rules under 
which members operate; members do not have a choice about making firm quotes, honoring 
their quotes, or reporting their trades within the allotted three minutes. If they find the rules 
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onerous, their only alternative is to leave the Exchange, or to pressure the Exchange to have the 
rules changed. 
Nash bargaining suggests that member firms will have extremely limited bargaining 
power when acting individually. If a single market maker leaves the Exchange, no harm is done 
to the Exchange. Several market making members have indeed left, with no adverse effect on 
market quality o r  trading volume. In contrast, since there is virtually all equities trading in the 
U.K. passes through the Exchange, if a market maker leaves the Exchange, it has withdrawn 
from equities dealing. This disparity suggests that a single market maker acting alone is likely 
to get badly hurt, and that the advantage in bargaining power lies with the LSE. There is some 
concern in London that if enough market makers were to leave the market, market quality might 
suffer and investors might pay significantly higher dealing costs. There is no evidence that this 
is occurring. W i l e  the weakest market makers have withdrawn, most of the remaining players 
are resisting leaving; each hopes to be a survivor, and each hopes that the final survivors will 
enjoy significant profit opportunities. As long as members' expectations are that they will 
ultimately profit from their Exchange participation, they will remain. As long as most members 
remain, they will be in a weak bargaining position relative to the Exchange. However, members 
also m A e  -3-'es. Acting jointly in their capacity as rule makers they may be able to develop a 
new cooperative solution, less damaging to themselves. Thus, problems in the market, and 
greater bargaining power of the LSE relative to individual members, are reflected in the 
members' ongoing efforts to alter the Exchange rules in a manner that will allow them to 
recover some of the benefits from technology. 
Examination of the endowments of critical resources similarly suggests that member firms 
will have limited economic power. The Exchange controls the following resources: 
Liquidity. The Exchange is the highest quality, most liquid market in 
Europe. This is probably the most important asset an Exchange can 
enjoy. As we have shown in previous work [16], this is extremely 
difficult for a competitor to attack; thus, the Exchange's strength\exhibits 
tight appropriability . 
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Price Information. The London Stock Exchange is the source of accurate 
bid and offer quotes, rapidly and accurately disseminated. Once all 
market participants employ SEAQ, there is great risk associated with any 
market maker leaving it due to participation externalities. This creates a 
strong barrier to competitors' launching competing screen based systems 
and again exhibits tight appropriability. 
Settlement and Clearing. The Exchange provides settlement and clearing 
services after trades are completed. No single member can develop 
competing infrastructure. 
Oversight of Market Activities. The Exchange provides surveillance and 
regulatory oversight, and thus enjoys a significant reputation effect that 
causes trades to be directed to it. Again, this would be difficult for a 
competitor to assault, and exhibits tight appropriability. 
Thus, the Exchange enjoys tight appropriability on its Big Bang innovations, and can expect to 
retain most of the benefits. 
In contrast, individual market makers control resources that are less critical, and it is less 
difficult to replace any single market making firm: 
Quotes. They control their own quotes, including information not on the 
SEAQ screen. Unfortunately, this has become a commodity; quotes from 
competing market makers have become largely interchangeable as each 
will generally match competitors' bids and offers. As providers of a 
commodity factor in SEAQ's success, market makers are poorly 
positioned to retain benefits; rather, their share of benefits is competed 
away to customers. 
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Risk Capital. Market makers provide capital for immediacy, allowing 
customers to execute even extremely large trades without delay assembling 
counter-parties. However, this, too has become a commodity. The 
opening of the Exchange led to too many market makers and too much 
capital chasing too few customers and too few trades; once again, the 
market makers' share of benefits created by Big Bang are competed away 
to customers. 
This suggests that market maker members cannot defend their share of benefits, and that those 
benefits not retained by the Exchange will be competed away to end customers. This indeed is 
what we have observed. 
6. Conclusions 
Summary of Member Response to Big Bang. There has been a considerable degree of 
confusion and discord in the London equities market since Big Bang, resulting in large measure 
from the improvements instituted as part of the Big Bang reforms. The systems investments 
associated with Big Bang have been profitable for the Exchange: ' 
Trading volume has increased, resulting in greater fee and market data 
revenue. 
Trading volume in non-U.K. securities has been captured from foreign 
bourses, principally Stockholm, Paris, Frankfurt, and Amsterdam; this too 
has resulted in greater fees for the Exchange. 
The Exchange's technology, especially the SEAQ screen, is essential for 
ail market participants, and market data has become significant revenue 
sourde as well. 
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The Big Bang investments in technology likewise have been beneficial for the Exchange's 
institutional customers: 
Increased transparency has led to lower search costs, allowing customers 
to monitor the market more closely. 
Increased transparency has led to heightened competition among market 
makers, reducing spreads and lowering customers' dealing costs. 
The systems investments made by the Exchange have been shown to have produced a 
significant economic surplus far in excess of the £25 million IOS investment. And yet, the 
distribution of these benefits has been uneven, with little or no benefits accruing to the 
Exchange's member firms. There are senior industry participants who believe that this lack of 
benefit for the members should have been foreseen at the time that Big Bang was planned, but 
clearly it was not. That is, the economic surplus created by interorganizational trading systems 
was correctly envisioned, but the division of this surplus, and the negative impacts on the 
member firms that actually paid for the investments, were not foreseen. This is confirmed by 
the following: 
The members voted overwhelmingly to support the reforms and the 
introduction of a screen-based market. Seventy-five percent of the 
Exchange's 4,495 individual members voted for the Big Bang changes in 
1985. 
Losses are being sustained by the membership. Average annual return on 
capital for 1987-1990 was negative. Margins as reflected by spreads and 
commissions were lower, and staffing levels have been reduced. Some 
members have closed down lines of business in an effort to stem losses. 
As the impact of SEAQ and of Big Bang's transparency improvements 
became clear to members, they have acted individually to subvert, or at 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-92-19 
Turmoil, Transparency, and Tea: IT in London's Stock Market Page 32 
least reduce, these improvements. Actions include lowering the quality 
of their SEAQ quotations and relying on negotiated prices inside the 
touch, or negotiated deals for large trades. By increasing customer search 
costs and lowering market transparency, they hope to restore profitability. 
They also acted collectively, through Exchange committees, to weaken Big 
Bang reforms. Probably the most controversial changes involved reducing 
the publication of large trades. 
Members have continued to act in ways designed to limit the damage caused them by the 
Exchange's technological improvements. Several proposals were put forward by the Elwes 
Committee to make the market structure more flexible for investors. Many of these, including 
a proposed limit order matching facility, were stalled by the Exchange market maker and 
eventually rejected. [37] 
Competitive Implications for the Stock Exchange. In our earlier study of the London Stock 
Exchange [13] we argued that Big Bang reforms had given the Exchange competitive advantage 
relative to European bourses. We suggested that for a variety of reasons, including the 
significant liquidity already present in London, this advantage might be sustainable. This 
appears to have been correct. Despite major reforms undertaken by most European exchanges, 
London's share of cross border trading, and its attractiveness for large trades, continue to 
increase. However, the improvements in trading technology in other markets and the threat of 
trading activity moving to another venue would have eventually forced the London Stock 
Exchange to make many of the changes that were introduced in 1986. That is, an efficient 
transparent trading mechanism may have become a strategic necessity - an essential aspect of 
operating a securities market [8]. Thus, while Exchange members are extremely dissatisfied 
when they compare the status of their operations in 1987 through 1991 with their operations 
prior to Big Bang, this may be a misleading comparison. A more reasonable comparison might 
be to compare the status of their operations today with an estimate of the status of their 
operations if they had failed to modernize and introduce market transparency. We call such use 
of inappropriate comparisons "the trap of the vanishing status quo." [14] 
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The unanticipated effects of Big Bang, and the damage done to those parties that paid for 
technological improvements at the LSE, have led to damaging market practices by the member 
firms, revisionist tinkering with trading rules, and some deterioration in the quality of the 
market. W i l e  the systems investments were shown to have produced a net surplus when 
summed over all market stakeholders - investor customers, the Exchange, and member firms 
- the Exchange's members retained no benefits and are probably worse off than they had been 
prior to 1986. We find an uneven distribution of benefits can potentially subvert the efficient 
functioning of a major 10s. 
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